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God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, & Human Autonomy, by John E. 
Hare. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2001. Pp. x and 122 
(indexed). $14.00 (cloth). 
JANINE MARIE IDZIAK, Loras College 
1his book records the three Stob Lectures given by John Hare at Calvin 
College in October 1999. Overall, Hare's aim is to offer "an account of 
God's authority in human morality" (p. vii). The subtitle indicates the 
focus of each lecture. 
The first chapter presents a history of the twentieth century debate 
between moral realists, who emphasize the reality of value properties inde-
pendent of our attempts at evaluation, and moral expressivists, who empha-
size the role of value judgment in expressing the will or emotion or desire 
(p.l). Hare's review and critical assessment of this body of literature leads 
to an articulation of his own position of prescriptive realism, which is "the 
view that when a person judges that something is good, he is endorsing 
(from inside) an attraction (from outside) which he feels towards it" (p. 
viii). In other words, "an evaluative judgment endorses a response to a 
pull of the good which is there independently of the evaluation" (p. 49). 
Hare further suggests that we can "identify this pull of the good as God's 
call to us" (pA9), which leads into a divine command ethical theory. 
Specifically, an ethics of divine commands "sees our obligations as an 
expression of God's will, and then our judgments of obligation as an 
expression of our will to recapitulate God's willing in ours" (p. 49). 
Hare remarks that "Divine command theory is an option that most recent 
ethicists in philosophy have dismissed" and sees natural law theory as hav-
ing "taken possession of the field as the theist alternative to a secular ethical 
theory" (p. 49). He proposes two explanations for this state of affairs. The 
first is "the negative power of an argument by Kant" (p. 50) concerning 
human autonomy. The second reason is that "ethicists have not taken seri-
ously the complex and difficult writing on this issue by the thirteenth-centu-
ry Franciscan philosopher and theologian John Duns Scotus" (p. 50). 
I will focus my discussion of Hare's book on the second chapter dealing 
with Duns Scotus. I do this because of the praise Hare lavishes on Scotus 
in claiming that "the version of divine command theory which Scotus 
gives us is the best we have" and that "anyone should be interested in it 
who wants to say that what makes something obligatory for us is that God 
commands it" (p. 52). While pointing out some rough spots in Hare's 
understanding of Scotus, I will call attention to two areas of his lecture 
which can advance our discussion of an ethics of divine commands. 
Exegesis of Scotus 
To praise Scotus as offering the best version of divine command theory 
available presupposes that Scotus is to be placed squarely within the 
divine command camp. However, in even classifying Scotus as a divine 
command ethicist, a more nuanced exegesis of Scotus is needed than that 
given by Hare. 
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In speaking of Scotus as a divine command ethicist, the first text that 
Hare brings forward is from Reportata Parisiensia I, distinction 48, question 
one: "The divine will is the cause of the good, and so a thing is good pre-
cisely in virtue of the fact that God wills it." l While this statement seems 
like a clear commitment to an ethics of divine commands, there are also 
texts in the Reportata Parisiensia which are inconsistent with adherence to 
an ethics of divine commands, specifically, texts which describe some 
actions as evil in themselves.' Before accusing Scotus of hopeless inconsis-
tency in his ethics, we should take note of Allan Wolter's reminder that the 
Reportata Parisiensia represents "unexamined student reports." 3 A more 
reliable source for Scotus' views is the Ordinatio, his revision of his com-
mentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: 
Hare has correctly recognized that Ordinatio III, suppl. distinction 37, on 
whether all the commandments of the decalogue belong to the natural law, 
is a critical text in understanding Scotus'ethical views (see pp. 67-78). 
However, Hare has not correctly interpreted the import of this text with 
respect to Scotus' commitment to an ethics of divine commands. 
In answering the question posed, Scotus distinguishes two senses in 
which a precept can be said to belong to the law of nature. Speaking strictly, 
the natural law contains only first practical principles known from their 
terms, and precepts which are conclusions necessarily entailed by these prin-
ciples. Speaking more broadly, the law of nature is said to include precepts 
which are in harmony with the aforementioned first practical principles, 
although not following necessarily from them. According to Scotus, the first 
two commandments of the decalogue belong to natural law strictly inter-
preted while all the commandments of the second table are part of the natur-
allaw only in the broader sense. Scotus is more tentative with respect to the 
third commandment of the decalogue concerning the Sabbath, raising 
doubts that this precept belongs to the natural law in a strict sense.s 
Scotus' consideration of the status of the commandments of the decalogue 
involves the possibility of God granting dispensations to these precepts. 
According to Scotus, "to dispense does not consist in letting the precept 
stand and permitting one to act against it"; rather, "to dispense .. .is to revoke 
the precept or declare how it is to be understood."6 After presenting this def-
inition of dispensation, Scotus gives a reformulation of the question whether 
the commandments of the decalogue are subject to dispensation which clear-
ly indicates that, in this context, he has in mind a situation in which God 
revokes the precept? And if God can grant such a dispensation from a pre-
cept which e.g., forbids a certain type of action, then it is the case that God 
can bring it about that act a in circumstances c is forbidden at one time but is 
not forbidden at another time. Hence, Scotus' notion of divine dispensation 
with respect to the commandments of the decalogue is of a case in which 
God literally changes the moral status of a particular type of action. 
Soctus maintains that God cannot grant a dispensation from precepts 
which belong to the natural law in a strict sense, and hence, from the first 
and second precepts of the decalogue.8 Scotus is thus claiming that it is not 
within God's power to revoke these precepts and to change the moral sta-
tus of the actions described in them. In effect, he regards the first and sec-
ond commandments of the decalogue as obtaining independently of Cod. 
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Because of this, Scotus cannot be regarded as articulating a thoroughgoing 
ethics of divine commands in this text. He did, however, make progress 
towards the articulation of the divine command position by his views on 
the commandments of the second table of the decalogue. For Scotus com-
mits himself to the position that these moral principles owe their status to 
God, first, in maintaining that God was not required to endorse the pre-
cepts belonging to the second table although God in fact did SO,9 and sec-
ond, in recognizing God's ability to grant dispensations to the command-
ments of the second table.lO 
Hare recognizes the two ways in which a precept can be said to belong 
to the natural law, viz., strictly and broadly, and concomitantly, he correct-
ly perceives Scotus' application of this distinction to the first and second 
tables of the decalogue. (pp. 67, 72). Hare is also cognizant of Scotus' views 
on divinely granted dispensations to the precepts of the second table of the 
decalogue (p. 73), and correctly describes the precepts of the second table 
as "within God's discretion" (p. 73; see also p. 75). However, Hare fails to 
recognize that the text in question commits Scotus only to a partial ethics of 
divine commands. 
Human Nature 
Fundamentally, natural law ethics maintains that what is right and wrong 
is based on human nature. Some natural law ethicists go so far as to claim 
that moral precepts can be deduced from true statements about human 
nature (p. 54). Hare maintains that Scotus rejects such a deductive model 
(p.63). 
According to Scotus, the final end of human beings is union with God, 
more exactly, becoming co-lovers with God and entering into the love that 
exists between the three persons of the Trinity (pp. 66-7). Hare interprets 
Scotus as holding that "there is no necessary connection between our creat-
ed natures and the way we reach our final end" (p. 69). At least with 
respect to the precepts regarding our neighbor, the way by which humans 
reach their final end is at God's discretion (p. 75). As Hare puts it: 
There are innumerable ways God could have ordered us towards 
union, even given the nature with which we were created. The route 
God has in fact chosen is binding upon us because God has chosen it. 
(p.77) 
The correctness of Hare's interpretation of Scotus on this point is evi-
denced by the dispensations which Scotus thought that God has granted to 
the precepts of the decalogue. For example, polygamy as well as 
monogamy was allowed to the ancient patriarchs. J1 Or again, Hare himself 
makes note of Scotus' recognition of both private property and common 
property as possible structures for life in a community or state (pp. 68~69) 
and hence as compatible with human nature. 
Since human nature is so central to natural law thinking, Hare's discus-
sion is insightful in raising of the question of the relation between moral 
precepts and human nature within the framework of an ethics of divine 
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commands. We can look to the historical literature to stimulate our think-
ing about this. , 
For example, in his defense of the divine command theory the four-
teenth century Franciscan Andrew of Neufchateau considers the objection 
that the theory entails that God could command a human being to "fly and 
do contradictory things at the same time."12 Andrew replies that flit is 
impossible to obligate to actions which are inconsistent with human 
nature."13 For God willing that human beings fly or do contradictory 
things simultaneously would be "for God to will to do what is not doable 
and thus for God to will irrationally and in a way subject to frustration ... ".14 
In effect, Andrew is suggesting that human nature delineates a range of 
possible actions for human beings and that divine commands concerning 
right and wrong actions must operate within the parameters established by 
human nature. 
An even stronger connection between divine commands and human 
nature is postulated by John Locke in his Essays on the Law of Nature: 
"Hence, this law of nature can be described as being the decree of the 
divine will discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and 
what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason 
commanding or prohibiting."ls That Locke is still placing priority on the 
divine will is indicated by his comment on natural law immediately fol-
lowing this statement: "It appears to me less correctly termed by some peo-
ple the dictate of reason, since reason does not so much establish and pro-
nounce this law of nature as search for it and discover it as a law enacted 
by a superior power ... ".16 Nevertheless, in claiming that God chooses the 
precepts which he does because of their conformity with our rational 
human nature, Locke is working towards a union of divine command 
ethics with the perspectives of the natural law ethical system.17 
Making Morality Arbitrary 
Hare correctly notes that one of the standard objections to an ethics of 
divine commands is that it makes morality arbitrary (p. 74) as based solely 
on the choices of the divine will. A standard reply has been to claim that 
God's choices are not arbitrary because they are made in accordance with 
the character of the divine nature (p. 72). Hare develops a different type of 
reply which a Scotist might make to this objection. 
Specifically, although the path to union with God specified in the com-
mandments of the second table of the decalogue holds true only because of 
divine commands, God's willing these precepts is not without reason since 
they are chosen as a route to the final end of human beings (p. 73). Further, 
they take us to a final end, union with God as co-lovers, which is "fitted to 
our nature" (p. 77). 
Hare's line of reply thus far is not sufficient to defeat the objection. 
Consider this analogy. As a professor, I am making out the syllabus for a 
course required for philosophy majors. In determining course require-
ments, I can try to design exam formats which achieve certain learning 
goals (e.g., take-home essay exams which require "doing philosophy") or 
simply schedule traditional in-class mid-term and final exams. Both the 
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take-home essay exams and the in-class exams are paths to the end of stu-
dents passing the course and, in turn, achieving a major in philosophy. 
Nevertheless, scheduling in-class exams simply because this has tradition-
ally been done has an air of arbitrariness in comparison with course 
requirements tied to specific learning objectives. 
Similarly, God could conceivably choose as the route to the final end of 
human beings courses of action which seem inherently arbitrary (e.g., pro-
hibiting marriage with any person with red hair) or perhaps downright 
repugnant to our moral common sense. Indeed, Hare himself raises the 
question whether we must say that God could have commanded bestiality 
as the morally right expression of our sexuality (p. 74). 
Thus it is critical that Hare goes beyond claiming that our final end of 
union with God fits our human nature, also proposing that the moral law 
regarding our neighbor which in fact obtains fits our nature in our present life 
in that "we flourish after keeping the law" and "we deteriorate after break-
ing it" (p. 75). For example, the "command not to bear false witness fits the 
human being's deep-seated desire to share life together with other humans 
on the basis of verbal communication" (p. 77). Unfortunately, such com-
ments represent Hare's own speculations rather than texts from Scotus (pp. 
75-78). 
What Scotus does say is that the precepts of the second table of the deca-
logue, which belong to the natural law in the broad sense, are "very much 
in harmony" with the first practical principles known of necessity which 
belong to the natural law in the strict sense.18 It should be noted that Sctous 
speaks directly of principles being in harmony with each other rather than of 
principles being consonant with our human nature. Nevertheless, the 
claim that the principles of the second table are "very much in harmony" 
with natural law strictly speaking can still provide a defense against the 
objection that they are arbitrary just because their status as moral precepts 
depends on divine commands. And this still represents a different strategy 
of reply to the arbitrariness objection than the standard one of invoking the 
character of God's nature. 
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